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Abstract
Understanding whether and how the places where people live, work, and play are associated with 
health behaviors and health is essential to understanding the social determinants of health. 
However, social-spatial data which link a person and their attributes to a geographic location (e.g., 
home address) create potential confidentiality risks. Despite the growing body of literature 
describing approaches to protect individual confidentiality when utilizing social-spatial data, peer-
reviewed manuscripts displaying identifiable individual point data or quasi-identifiers (attributes 
associated with the individual or disease that narrow identification) in maps persist, suggesting that 
knowledge has not been effectively translated into public health research practices. Using sexual 
and reproductive health as a case study, we explore the extent to which maps appearing in recent 
peer-reviewed publications risk participant confidentiality. Our scoping review of sexual and 
reproductive health literature published and indexed in PubMed between January 1, 2013 and 
September 1, 2015 identified 45 manuscripts displaying participant data in maps as points or 
small-population geographic units, spanning 26 journals and representing studies conducted in 20 
countries. Notably, 56% (13/23) of publications presenting point data on maps either did not 
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describe approaches used to mask data or masked data inadequately. Furthermore, 18% (4/22) of 
publications displaying data using small-population geographic units included at least two quasi-
identifiers. These findings highlight the need for heightened education for researchers, reviewers, 
and editorial teams. We aim to provide readers with a primer on key confidentiality considerations 
when utilizing linked social-spatial data for visualizing results. Given the widespread availability 
of place-based data and the ease of creating maps, it is critically important to raise awareness on 
when social-spatial data constitute protected health information, best practices for masking 
geographic identifiers, and methods of balancing disclosure risk and scientific utility. We conclude 
with recommendations to support the preservation of confidentiality when disseminating results.
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Social-Spatial Data; Sexual Health; Confidentiality; Quasi-identifiers; Maps
Introduction
Understanding whether and how the places where people live, work, and play are associated 
with health behaviors and outcomes is an essential underpinning of public health, as 
evidenced by the early work of John Snow (Snow, 1855) during the London cholera 
epidemic and the growing current interest in using geospatial data in public health research 
(e.g., Cooper et al., 2014; Diez-Roux, 2000; Law et al., 2004). The relative ease of using 
geographic information system (GIS) software (see Glossary of Key Terms, Figure 1), 
combined with the availability of individual-level population data (“microdata”) have 
significantly expanded opportunities for public health researchers to explore relationships of 
place to health, and to visualize results using maps (Brownstein et al., 2006a; Chang et al., 
2009; A. J. Curtis et al., 2006; Lozano-Fuentes et al., 2008; Palmer et al., 2013; Ruggles, 
2014). The growing presence of datasets that link spatial information such as individual 
home address to individual attributes such as gender, race, or behaviors (“linked social-
spatial data”) facilitates this evolving research agenda. For people studying and intervening 
in sexual health, linked social-spatial data provide unique insight into etiologic patterns of 
disease (e.g., identifying spatial patterns of sexually-transmitted infections [STIs]), 
prevention planning (e.g., using space and time sampling methodologies to identify venues 
where high risk sexual and drug-use behaviors occur), and resource allocation (e.g., 
prioritization of HIV/AIDS funding to geographic areas with high prevalence of HIV 
infection).
While linked social-spatial data have clear benefits for public health research and 
interventions, their collection and use create potential risks (Wartenberg & Thompson, 
2010). In 2006, a series of articles brought attention to the widespread publication of maps 
including unmasked individual-level point data (e.g., points representing the latitude and 
longitude of an individual’s home), demonstrating the relative ease and troubling accuracy 
through which these points could be reverse coded to physical addresses (Brownstein et al., 
2006a; Brownstein et al., 2006b; A. J. Curtis et al., 2006). Kounadi and Leitner 
demonstrated that between 2005 and 2012, the number of published articles including maps 
Haley et al. Page 2
Soc Sci Med. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 October 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
with unmasked individual point data in 19 GIScience and geography journals increased, 
potentially revealing more than 68,000 home addresses (Kounadi & Leitner, 2014).
Collectively, these findings underscore that despite growing literature raising the alarm about 
potential confidentiality breaches, as well as development of new methods for geomasking 
spatial data (e.g., Allshouse et al., 2010; Bader et al., 2016; Gutmann et al., 2008; Hampton 
et al., 2010; Kounadi et al., 2013; Kounadi & Leitner, 2015; Krumm, 2007; Seidl et al., 
2015; VanWey et al., 2005), many public health researchers remain unaware of the potential 
risks and evolving solutions to help mitigate these risks. Our failure to effectively translate 
existing knowledge into practice may be due in part to the evolving intersection of two fields 
of inquiry (e.g., geography and public health). Discourse about geo-privacy as well as 
discussion of methods for effective geomasking have been concentrated largely in 
geography/GIScience and in highly specialized and/or technical journals (e.g., International 
Journal of Health Geographics, Statistics in Medicine). However, geocoding, mapping, and 
spatial analytic methodologies have simultaneously diffused to non-geographically trained 
investigators in public health. Given the rapid advances in technology, the absence of 
uniform guidelines for using linked social-spatial data for social and behavioral health 
research, and an absence of modules on linked social-spatial data in core training platforms 
for public health researchers (e.g., Human Subjects Protections, Good Clinical Practices), it 
is critically important that we raise awareness and educate investigators who may not 
otherwise be familiar with past work (Gutmann et al., 2008; National Research Council 
(U.S.). Panel on Confidentiality Issues Arising from the Integration of Remotely Sensed and 
Self-Identifying Data., 2007; VanWey et al., 2005).
The aim of this paper is to bridge the critical gap between knowledge and practice by 
providing readers with a primer on key considerations for protecting participant 
confidentiality when disseminating study results generated from linked social-spatial data, 
including guidance on when geospatial data constitute protected health information (PHI) 
and current best practices for masking geographic identifiers. Using sexual and reproductive 
health, a field in which researchers routinely collect data on stigmatizing behaviors and 
health outcomes, as a case study, we characterize the extent to which peer-reviewed 
literature published and indexed in PubMed between January 1, 2013 and September 1, 2015 
risks participant confidentiality by presenting maps with 1) unmasked point data or 2) small-
population area-based geographic units that include additional demographic information 
associated with the individual or disease helping to narrow identification (“quasi-
identifiers”). Geospatial data can be uniquely identifying when combined with quasi-
identifiers (El Emam et al., 2010; Kounadi et al., 2013; Sweeney, 2000, 2002; VanWey et al., 
2005). However, to our knowledge, no previous studies have assessed the extent to which 
maps in peer-reviewed publications risk participant confidentiality by including quasi-
identifiers when presenting results using small-population area-based geographic units. In 
contrast to Kounadi and Leitner’s review, we did not restrict this review to journals that 
specialize in GIScience and did not limit our review to maps that present participant data 
using points or trajectories. We conclude with recommendations to support the preservation 
of participant confidentiality when disseminating study results generated from linked social-
spatial data.
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Defining Linked Social-Spatial Data
Understanding when geospatial units constitute PHI is critical to discussions of maintaining 
confidentiality of linked social-spatial data for public health research (Nass et al., 2009). For 
the purposes of our analysis, we utilize the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPPA) Privacy Rule definition of PHI. We have selected this definition because it 
provides a clear, minimum standard of what constitutes PHI and many researchers exploring 
the social determinants of health in the United States (U.S.) are likely to draw data or work 
for agencies considered covered entities (e.g., designated health care groups, organizations, 
or businesses). However, the definition of PHI may vary based on additional institutional and 
funder regulations, and state and country guidelines (e.g., Boulos et al., 2009; El Emam et 
al., 2015a; Lovett et al., 2008; Yarmohammadian et al., 2010). We urge researchers using 
linking social-spatial data to determine the specific requirements for their own research.
According to the Privacy Rule, PHI is defined as “individually identifiable health 
information transmitted or maintained by a covered entity or its business associates in any 
form or medium” (Office of Clinical Research, 2012). Common identifiers include name and 
birth date. Geographic subdivisions smaller than a state (e.g., county, city, precinct, postal 
code, census tract, street address, latitude and longitude) are considered identifiable when 
linked to individual level health information (e.g., any information related to past, present, or 
future physical or mental health, including behaviors and health care utilization). For 
example, census tracts are geographic units utilized by the U.S. Census Bureau which 
contain on average 4,000 persons (though some have more or many less) and are typically 
homogeneous with respect to population characteristics, economic status, and living 
conditions (Krieger et al., 2003b). A dataset that combines an individual’s census tract with 
behavioral data (e.g., frequency of unprotected sex in the past six months) represents 
identifiable linked social-spatial data, even if the individual’s name or exact address has 
been stripped from the dataset.
Data are considered de-identified in accordance with the HIPPA Privacy Rule if the data do 
not “identify an individual and if the covered entity has no reasonable basis to believe it can 
be used to identify an individual” (Office of Clinical Research, 2012). There are two 
approaches to de-identify geographic information using these guidelines: 1) removing or 
aggregating geographic identifiers to large-population area-based units; and 2) applying 
statistical or scientific principles to render information not individually identifiable 
(“geomasking”) by a person with “appropriate knowledge and experience” (Office of 
Clinical Research, 2012).
Disclosure risk and approaches to protecting individual confidentiality
Disclosure risk associated with visualizing linked social-spatial data depends on the 
geographic coverage of the data, whether and how geographic units and individuals were 
sampled, the availability of quasi-identifiers, the availability of previously generated datasets 
or maps, and the heterogeneity of individuals and sample clusters (A. Curtis et al., 2011; El 
Emam et al., 2011; El Emam et al., 2015b; VanWey et al., 2005). To date, there is no 
universal standard for “adequate confidentiality protection” or “acceptable risk” (VanWey et 
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al., 2005). Selecting an approach to reduce the probability of identifying individuals, while 
preserving the characteristics of the geographic data for valid inference depends in part on 
the nature of the data, acceptable confidentiality risk, and current and future use of the data 
(Armstrong et al., 1999; A. Curtis et al., 2011; El Emam et al., 2011; El Emam et al., 2015b; 
Kounadi & Leitner, 2015; Seidl et al., 2015; VanWey et al., 2005). For example, point data 
are more suitable for disease surveillance and outbreak investigation, but have a high risk of 
compromising individual identity if released publicly. In contrast, using area-based 
geographic units with larger population sizes may be less likely to compromise individual 
confidentiality (A. Curtis et al., 2011) and can be used to explore contextual associations of 
place and behavioral or disease outcomes (e.g., associations between living in high poverty 
areas and sexual risk behaviors), but are less sensitive to cluster detection and may fail to 
capture relationships that occur on a smaller geographic scale (Krieger et al., 2003a; Krieger 
et al., 2003b; Oakes & Kaufman, 2006). Table 1 provides an overview of several approaches 
to simultaneously preserve the confidentiality of individual records and the geographic 
attributes of the data (“geomasking”). Table 1 is based on a framework first presented by 
Armstrong and colleagues in 1999 (Armstrong et al., 1999), but has been expanded to 
include more recent adaptive geomasking and simulation techniques (Allshouse et al., 2010; 
Hampton et al., 2010; Wieland et al., 2008). For visual depiction of geomasking approaches, 
please see Kounadi and Leitner (Kounadi & Leitner, 2014) and Zandbergen (Zandbergen, 
2014).
Case Study: Visual presentation of unmasked point data in recent journal 
publications related to sexual and reproductive health
Scoping Review Methods
We conducted a scoping review of all articles published and indexed in PubMed between 
January 1, 2013 and September 1, 2015 using the search terms “(map OR mapping OR 
geographical OR geographic OR GIS OR geospatial OR spatial) AND (sexual health OR 
sexual behavior OR reproductive health OR HIV OR AIDS OR STI)” and filters “English” 
and “Humans” (Figure 2). A scoping review is designed to rapidly assess a large volume of 
literature in order to provide an overview of the type, extent, and quantity of research on a 
given topic (Arksey & O’Malley, 2005; Levac et al., 2010; Littell et al., 2008). We based key 
words on the methods utilized by Brownstein and colleagues (Brownstein et al., 2006a; 
Brownstein et al., 2006b), but included additional content-specific key words in order to 
limit the search to content areas related to sexual and reproductive health. We first excluded 
articles that were not relevant to the review based on the title and abstract (e.g., laboratory/
molecular science, fields unrelated to sexual and reproductive health [e.g., brain science, 
audiology], reviews and commentaries). Secondly, all remaining articles were inspected to 
determine whether they included maps. For articles including maps, we reviewed the 
methods, results, and figures to determine whether the maps displayed linked social-spatial 
data, and if so, the unit at which data were presented. For maps presenting data as points or 
geographic units with average population sizes ≤30,000, we further reviewed the methods, 
results, and figures to determine if additional quasi-identifiers were presented, and for point 
data, whether and how the data were masked. For articles presenting point data, we also 
researched the data source in order to identify whether the authors utilized secondary 
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datasets in which geographic identifiers were masked by the data custodian prior to release. 
We selected 30,000 as a cut-off because past studies have successfully identified individuals 
from publically-available datasets including postal code information (Sweeney, 2002), and 
the average size of a U.S. postal code is 30,000. We categorized articles that presented maps 
as follows:
1. Maps did not display linked social-spatial data: Articles in this category 
included maps that did not present linked social-spatial data, such as maps 
for reference purposes only (e.g., map of country where research was 
conducted) or maps that presented locations of non-human subjects (e.g., 
HIV testing clinics), or microdata on individuals only (e.g., data obtained 
from U.S. Census).
2. Data aggregated to units with average populations larger than 30,000 
people: Articles in this category included maps displaying linked social-
spatial data at an aggregated unit with an average population size greater 
than 30,000 people and were unlikely to risk individual participant 
confidentiality.
3. Data aggregated to units with average populations ≤30,000 people: 
Articles falling in this category included maps displaying linked social-
spatial data at an aggregated unit with an average population size ≤30,000 
people that could be used as a proxy for a neighborhood or community or 
could risk individual confidentiality in the presence of quasi-identifiers.
4. Point data: Articles in this category included maps that presented point 
data representing home addresses or individual trajectories associated with 
confidential individual-level information. This category was further 
subdivided as follows:
a. Masked data included maps that presented point data and 
either included information on whether or how the points 
were masked or utilized datasets that were masked by the 
data custodian prior to release for secondary data analyses.
b. Insufficiently masked point data: In reviewing articles in 
the “masked’ category, we determined that a number of 
manuscripts described masking data points included in 
maps, but subsequently included sufficient information in 
the methods, results, or maps for the authors to question 
whether participant confidentiality was adequately 
protected (e.g., presence of multiple quasi-identifiers, 
assigning points to the nearest intersection of two streets 
and providing street-level maps).
c. Unmasked or no masking information included maps that 
presented point data and did not include information on 
whether or how the points were masked. This classification 
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is consistent with past reviews (Brownstein et al., 2006b; 
Kounadi & Leitner, 2014).
All manuscripts were reviewed and categorized as described above by DFH. During this 
process, manuscripts that could not be clearly categorized were discussed and categorized 
based on consensus by DFH, SAM, and MRK. All manuscripts categorized as 
“insufficiently masked point data” were reviewed and categorized based on consensus by 
DFH, SAM, and MRK. As a final step, a random selection of 20 (43%) manuscripts 
displaying point data or data aggregated to units with average populations ≤30,000 people 
was reviewed and categorized by MRK. This categorization was compared with the primary 
coder (DFH) and discrepancies discussed. Final intercoder reliability was 95%.
Scoping Review Results
As outlined in Figure 2, our review of 1,171 manuscripts published and indexed in PubMed 
between January 1, 2013 and September 1, 2015 identified 151 manuscripts related to sexual 
and reproductive health including maps. Of these 151 manuscripts, 73 (48%) included maps 
that did not display linked social-spatial data and 33 (22%) displayed data at a geographic 
unit with an average population size greater than 30,000. Forty-five manuscripts (30%) 
presented linked social-spatial data in maps using geographic units with average population 
sizes ≤30,000 or points. These 45 studies were published in 26 journals and represent data 
from 20 countries.
Twenty-three manuscripts displayed maps with linked social-spatial point data. Of these 23 
manuscripts, 10 (43%) manuscripts presented masked point data: six utilized secondary 
datasets masked by the data custodian prior to release (i.e., DHS Program Demographic and 
Health Surveys), two displayed data in the absence of geographic references, and two stated 
data were “anonymized” but did not provide sufficient information for us to further assess 
masking. Thirteen manuscripts (56%) displayed maps with linked social-spatial point data 
that either did not include details on whether or how data were masked (n=8) or were 
insufficiently masked based on the methods described (n=5). For example within the 
“insufficiently masked” category, one manuscript noted that household points had been 
randomly moved a distance likely to locate the point within the same neighborhood/nearby 
properties. Another masked residential addresses by displaying point data for individuals in 
a small statistical area centroid, but displayed these points in a series of maps allowing the 
reader to determine not only the statistical area, but also the race, ethnicity, gender, and 
sexual orientation of the individual. A third manuscript displayed point data within a well-
demarcated community. Although the author did not include specific geographic references 
in the text or map, previous publications utilizing the same dataset presented aerial photos, 
allowing us to identify the community and even specific households identified in the figure. 
These 13 manuscripts, published in 9 different journals and representing data from five 
countries, represent potential confidentiality breaches of 14,581 study individuals, the 
majority of which reported highly stigmatized behaviors (e.g., men who have sex with men 
[MSM], “high risk” sexual behaviors, or illicit drug use) or health conditions (e.g., HIV 
infection, tuberculosis). Notably, 7 of these 13 studies utilized data from U.S. populations.
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Twenty two manuscripts displayed spatial data using geographic units with average 
population sizes ≤30,000. Four (18%) of the manuscripts in this category provided at least 
two additional quasi-identifiers (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, etc.) on the 
map or in the manuscript text. Depending on the area’s sociodemographic composition, 
these manuscripts potentially compromised the confidentiality of up to 668 individuals. 
Representing data from three countries, these four studies were published in four journals. 
Two of these four studies utilized data from U.S. populations.
Discussion
Our scoping review identified 17 manuscripts related to sexual and reproductive health 
published and indexed in PubMed between January 1, 2013 and September 1, 2015 
presenting insufficiently masked point data or small-population geographic units with quasi-
identifiers or did not include details on whether or how data were masked, potentially 
compromising the confidentiality of study participants. Similar to Kounadi and Leitner, we 
found that over half of manuscripts including maps with point data presented point data that 
were either unmasked or did not include details on whether or how data were masked 
(Kounadi & Leitner, 2014). Notably, our review identified 45 publications including maps 
representing point data or small-population areal units. These manuscripts spanned 26 
different journals and included data from 20 countries, underscoring the 1) broad use and 
publication of linked social-spatial data to explore the social determinants of health and 2) 
urgent need to ensure that researchers utilizing these data are well-versed on confidentiality 
considerations associated with using linked social-spatial data and approaches to mitigate 
these risks. Notably, the vast majority of studies presenting unmasked or insufficiently 
masked point data were based on U.S. populations. It is likely that our review, which does 
not extend to products not subject to the rigor of peer-review (e.g., reports, presentations), 
underestimates the extent to which presented maps compromise individual confidentiality.
The potential for harm associated with confidentiality breaches is particularly salient for 
individuals associated with stigmatizing behaviors (e.g., injection drug use) or conditions 
(e.g., HIV infection). Despite the growing body of literature describing approaches to 
preserving individual confidentiality when utilizing linked social-spatial data —and multiple 
layers of review by authors, reviewers, and editorial staff required prior to publication— 
peer-reviewed manuscripts which display identifiable individual point data or include quasi-
identifiers in maps persist. These transgressions violate a fundamental ethical obligation to 
protect individual confidentiality and may be due in part to a lack of uniform guidelines and 
rapid advances in technology (Chang et al., 2009).
Our discussion of the confidentiality considerations surrounding the use of linked social-
spatial data to explore the social determinants of sexual health follows the long debated 
challenge of how best to balance individual interests and the health of the public 
(Wartenberg & Thompson, 2010). The tension between preserving confidentiality while also 
ensuring scientific utility is evident when considering linked social-spatial data. Approaches 
are needed which simultaneously protect individual confidentiality while also maintaining 
spatial attributes of the data. We have a commitment to individuals involved in research to 
protect their data. However, disseminating study results is not only critical to advancing 
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science, but also maximizes value from public dollars spent on research and demonstrates 
respect for an individual’s time and efforts. Good stewardship is a key factor in ensuring 
these data continue to be collected and made available. Several manuscripts identified in our 
review attempted to mask individual point data, but did so inadequately or incompletely 
described efforts taken. Given the confidentiality risks associated with publishing point data 
on maps, even when geomasked, researchers should have clear justification for the added 
value of presenting data at this level (Brownstein et al., 2006a; Brownstein et al., 2006b; A. 
J. Curtis et al., 2006; Kounadi & Leitner, 2014). In many instances it may be possible for 
investigators to use point data or small areal units in analysis, but present summaries of their 
results as cluster statistics, aggregated maps, or tabular data, thus limiting the public 
dissemination of the PHI used in analysis. Decisions about whether to include maps, and the 
spatial unit if included, should be based on confidentiality and social harm considerations 
(including potential stigmatization of communities) as well as scientific utility. For example, 
although visually appealing, presenting point data or small areal units may not provide any 
additional information beyond what is already provided in study tables or results (e.g., 
cluster statistics). Alternatively, patterns or spatial distribution of data may be presented 
using other formats, such as aggregating point data to large-population areal units or 
presenting data in the absence of all geographic context. For an example of presenting data 
in the absence of all geographic context, see Chamie and colleagues (Chamie et al., 2015). 
However, even when presenting alternative formats, unintended consequences should be 
considered. For example, releasing or displaying HIV prevalence rates by smaller area-based 
units or mapping areas where “high risk” groups congregate may help HIV service 
organizations identify how best to allocate limited resources (Lorway & Khan, 2014). In 
contrast, this same information may result in marginalization of neighborhoods and labeling 
of its inhabitants as “high risk”. Notably, venue-mapping may risk social harms, particularly 
if maps display venues where congregants engage in illegal or highly stigmatized behaviors 
(e.g., MSM venues in countries where homosexuality is illegal). Decisions on whether and 
how to display spatial data visually, including whether maps should made available only 
through restricted access, should be made and implemented by teams with sufficient 
expertise in the analytic methods being applied, regulations, and the topic area.
We aim to increase awareness and inform future dialogue so that researchers, editors, and 
other public health professionals can make informed decisions on how best to disseminate 
findings. Based on the results of our scoping review and review of current best practices, we 
recommend the following:
1. Develop and include a module about utilizing spatial data as a standard 
component of Human Subjects Training for all professional in the field, 
including research and editorial staff. The Collaborative Institutional 
Training Initiative (CITI Program) provides peer-reviewed web-based 
Human Subjects Training for academic, government, and commercial 
organizations globally and is utilized by numerous organizations likely to 
engage in place-based human subjects research (Collaborative Institutional 
Training Initiative). Given the broad reach of this organization, the use of 
peer-review, and the established record in providing Human Subjects 
Training, CITI represents a likely institution to lead this effort.
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2. Include modules on confidentiality and stigma considerations in GIS 
tutorials and in academic coursework. This manuscript, including the 
citations included herein, draws upon both seminal and emerging work in 
this field and is intended to serve as a reference on confidentiality and 
stigma considerations when utilizing social-spatial data. The GIS&T Body 
of Knowledge (http://www.aag.org/bok/), a free online reference 
presenting a variety of topics relevant to GIScience may also serve as an 
additional resource (Ahearn et al., 2013; DiBiase et al., 2007).
3. Continue funder support for research to determine levels of privacy 
protection and scientific utility provided by geomasking, including 
acceptable confidentiality protections for dissemination by user and 
research stage. For example, the National Institutes of Health have 
demonstrated a commitment in this area, as evidenced by the Big Data to 
Knowledge (BD2K) Initiative (Margolis et al., 2014) and the 2016 
Conference on Geospatial Approaches to Cancer Control and Population 
Sciences (National Cancer Institute, 2016).
4. Establish uniform reporting requirements for presenting linked social-
spatial data, including (a) what geographic unit(s)/population size(s) of 
data may be presented; (b) guidelines for descriptions of methods used to 
protect individual confidentiality in publications; and (c) standard editorial 
procedures, including reviewer evaluative criteria, for ensuring published 
maps do not risk individual confidentiality. At minimum, any manuscript 
presenting social-spatial data using maps should be evaluated for potential 
confidentiality and stigma considerations by a peer-reviewer(s) with 
sufficient expertise in the topic area and methodology presented. However, 
evaluation of confidentiality considerations requires that authors report 
masking approaches as they would other aspects of their research (e.g., 
research design, analytic approaches). As noted previously, a number of 
the manuscripts in the “Unmasked or no masking information” category 
presented point data in maps but did not describe whether or how points 
were masked. It is possible that these authors took adequate precautions to 
protect participant confidentiality, but did not include this information in 
the manuscript due to word limitations, underscoring the need for editorial 
teams and reviewers to emphasize the value of this information. Of note, 
there may be circumstances when not fully describing masking methods is 
preferable (e.g., detailed description of masking facilitates reverse 
identification). In these instances, authors should state that they 
intentionally left masking procedures vague in order to protect participant 
confidentiality and potentially provide additional details upon request.
5. Expand CONSORT (Campbell et al., 2012) and TREND (Des Jarlais et 
al., 2004) reporting guidelines for randomized and non-randomized 
designs to include reporting of methodologies specific to linked social-
spatial data (e.g., geomasking). The use of standardized reporting 
improves the quality reporting of research in peer-reviewed publications 
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(Plint et al., 2006; Turner et al., 2012) and numerous high impact peer-
reviewed public health journals already endorse the use of CONSORT 
(e.g., The Lancet) and TREND (e.g., AIDS and Behavior).
The widespread availability of place-based data and the emerging nature of publicly 
available spatial data which capture activity spaces (e.g., point data collected from Twitter, 
geolocating phones using apps) will expand our ability to explore whether and how place 
contributes to the health of individuals and communities (Brownstein et al., 2006a; Chang et 
al., 2009; A. J. Curtis et al., 2006; Duncan et al., 2014; Lozano-Fuentes et al., 2008; Palmer 
et al., 2013). While these advances offer exciting research opportunities to improve the 
public’s health, these rapidly advancing technologies highlight the challenges associated 
with establishing guidelines for utilizing linked social-spatial data to explore the social 
determinants of health, and underscore the need for ongoing dialogue across key 
stakeholders (e.g., editors, public health professionals, data custodians, community-based 
organizations, communities) and leadership by professional organizations (e.g., International 
Committee of Medical Journal Editors, International AIDS Society, Association of 
American Geographers, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population) so as to 
preserve individual confidentiality and minimize group-level social harms while maximizing 
the benefit of this research for society at large.
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Research Highlights
• Using linked social-spatial data in sexual health research may risk 
confidentiality
• Over half of articles presenting point data on maps did not mask data 
adequately
• Several articles included maps with quasi-identifiers
• Publication of maps risking confidentiality occurs across a range of 
journals
• Findings highlight a need for heightened education for researchers and 
editors
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Figure 1. 
Glossary of key terms relevant to confidentiality considerations when visualizing results 
generated from linked social-spatial data
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Figure 2. 
Scoping review of publications related to the social determinants of sexual or reproductive 
health including identifiable linked social-spatial data published and indexed in PubMed 
between January 1, 2013 and September 1, 2015
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Table 1
Approaches to masking geographic identifiers based on the framework provided by Armstrong and Colleagues 
(Armstrong et al., 1999)
Approach Description Strengths Challenges
Record
Transformation
Records are aggregated across
covariate patterns, certain records
are suppressed, sampled or
multiplied by random noise
Limits individual re-identification Obscures spatial details needed
for spatial analyses (e.g., cluster
detection)
Results in missing data
Spatial
Aggregation
Data is summarized by spatial
units (e.g., assigned to an areal
unit polygon such as a census
tract)
Limits individual reidentifcation,
even at very small units (
A. Curtis et al., 2011)
Depending on unit, may
facilitate easier data
sharing/access
Obscures spatial details needed
for spatial analyses (e.g., cluster
detection) (Hampton et al., 2010)
Units may not correspond to
meaningful social or spatial
divisions (e.g., modifiable unit
problem) (Oakes & Kaufman, 2006)
Spatial units may not perform the
same for all outcomes (Krieger et al., 2002)
Point
Aggregation
Points which are in geographic
proximity are replaced by a
composite point (e.g., points are
clustered and assigned to an areal
unit centroid)
May allow for analyses that
require point data
Clustering techniques in and of
themselves are not benign and
may introduce error in spatial
analyses (e.g., inaccurate cluster
detection) (Hampton et al., 2010)
Affine
Transformation
Points are displaced by fixed
increments (translation), scaling
constants (scale), rotating each
point by a fixed angle around the
pivot point (rotation), or a
combination of the above
(concatenated)
Translation preserves overall
density, relative density, and
directional information
Techniques can be combined
to introduce more uncertainty
Displacement constants cannot be
shared
May not provide sufficient
anonymity (Wieland et al., 2008)
Spatial attributes of data
skewed/lost
Random
Perturbation
Displaces points by a random
increment and direction. Common
techniques include randomized
skew and Gaussian skew.
Displacement can be bounded
by geographic boundaries (e.g.,
within census tracts)
Introduction of random effects
may reduce re-identification
risks
Gaussian skew displacement
varies by population density
(e.g., points in rural areas are
displaced by greater distance
than urban areas) (Cassa et al., 2008)
Cluster detection superior to
aggregation (Hampton et al., 2010)
Does not preserve relative
locations and orientation of points
Randomized skew does not
account for underlying population
density
Points may be displaced a very
small distance from original point
Release of multiple, datasets
masked using Gaussian skew
may provide sufficient data for
reconstruction of original data
points (Cassa et al., 2008)
Gaussian skew displacement
parameters are user defined and
requires an understanding of
acceptable re-identification risk
Adaptive Techniques
Donut
Geomasking
More recent, adaptive geomasking
technique that displaces points
randomly by a minimum distance,
but less than a maximum distance
(Allshouse et al., 2010; Hampton 
et al., 2010)
Displacement can be bounded
by geographic boundaries (e.g.,
within census tracts)
Enhanced confidentiality
protections provided by
minimum displacement
parameters
Accounts for population density
Cluster detection superior to
aggregation (Hampton et al., 2010)
Displacement parameters are user
defined and requires an
understanding of acceptable re-
identification risk
Heterogeneous areas require
greater displacement (Allshouse et al., 2010)
Simulation Mathematical models (e.g., linear
programming, multiple 
imputation)
used to simulate new deidentified
latitude and longitude which
replace original data (Paiva et al., 
2014
;Wang & Reiter, 2012;
Wieland et al., 2008)
Displacement can be bounded
by geographic boundaries (e.g.,
within census tracts)
Preserves clusters
Moves point minimum specified
distance
Replaces participant
geographic data with simulated
data
Complex approaches that also
require point data
Displacement parameters are user
defined and requires an
understanding of acceptable re-
identification risk
Simulated data points coincide
with actual data
More recent approaches not
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Approach Description Strengths Challenges
evaluated extensively in practice
(Paiva et al., 2014; Wang & Reiter, 2012; 
Wieland et al., 2008)
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